

*The Resurrection of the same Numerical Body,
and its Reunion to the same Soul;*

Asserted in a

S E R M O N

Preached before the

University of OXFORD,

At St. Mary's.

On Easter-Monday, 1725.

In which Mr. Lock's Notions of Personality and Identity are confuted. And the Author of the *Naked Gospel* is answered.

By HENRY FELTON, D. D. Principal of Edmund-Hall, Rector of Whitwell, and Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Rutland.

Εἰδένεις δὲ οἰκεῖα τούτη πάλιν τορία καὶ μναῖμεν τῷ πᾶσσαν ζεῦ φύσιν εἰς
τοὺς οἰκεῖας μναῖμεν συγχείνειντο, οὐτέ τας αφεντικαῖς ἵκεσθαι, οὐτέ
εὐεὶς κανθῆν, καὶ οὐδὲπεπεποιηθῆν, καὶ νέων ἀπεισιν ἢ τῶν δηποτέρων
ζεύς κατεπάππανθῆν, καὶ τὸ πατέρος αἴματος ἵκεσθαι, φρεσιαλυθῆν, τῷ
ἄλλῳ μηρῷ ἴμεδίττα δὲ πάλιν αἰλίνεις, τὰς ἀντλιὰς ἵκειν χόρει, περὶ
τῶν εὖ ἀντανθεμάτος ἀμονίας τοῦ καὶ σίγουν, καὶ τὰς τὴν παρερθίτος ἢ καὶ
τῆτε διελαυδίτος ἀλάσκουν καὶ ζεύς.

Athenag. οὐδὲ ἀταπίστος; οὐ παρῆν.

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L O N D O N :

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**TO THE RIGHT REVEREND
FATHER IN GOD**

EDWARD LORD BISHOP

OF

Coventry and Lichfield.

My Lord,

THIS is one of the Anniversary Sermons, which are always repeated at St. Mary's Church on Low Sunday: As it was heard with good Acceptance by the University, I promise my self it will find a kind Reception at your Lordship's hands; especially since the Design of it is to defend an Important Article of our Faith.

A 2 against

against the Attempts of Infidels and Socinians under whatever Form they have appear'd, whether masked or barefaced, Naked or Disguised.

I have not touched upon any part of the Controversy between the most learned Dr Stillingfleet late Lord Bishop of Worcester and Mr Lock, but have only considered Mr Lock's Notions of Personality and Identity, as the Hypothesis, by which he would solve all Difficulties about the Resurrection; and, as he applies them, we find, he would persuade us, that upon his Scheme we may without any Difficulty conceive the same Person at the Resurrection, tho' in a Body not exactly in Make or Parts the same he had here, the same Consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it, whether (I may add, for so he means) that Soul be the same he had here, or no. Which is to say, that the Person may be the same, tho' neither Body nor Soul be the same, and so, for any thing the Soul signifies, Personality as well as Identity may consist in Consciousness alone. But I will add no more, lest I should seem to convey a Preface under the Cover of a Dedication.

Your Lordship's most learned Labours, so highly deserving of the Christian World will doubtless by GOD's Blessing meet with Success equal to their Applause; and that treasure of Learning so clearly open'd and display'd may prove a blessed Instrument in the hands of GOD to open the eyes of his Ancient People, when they shall see more evidently, than has yet been shewn them, how the Gospel is established, and may be proved to them, upon their own Sense of those Sacred Writers, whom they have received into their Canon of Scripture.

Your

Your Defence is able, if any Ingenuity remains in Him, to convince even the Nameless Author, you have overthrown; and (were that necessary, as he idly pretends) to make Him a Christian in his own Way.

It must look very Ridiculous and Absurd to see the Grounds and Reasons of Christianity proposed by an Unbeliever, who with equal Ignorance and Malice, and with Phlegm answerable to both, endeavours to prove, that It hath no Foundation but in Allegorical and Fanciful Interpretations, and when he has shew'd, after his manner of representing it, that the Allegory does not hold, he has show'd, he thinks, according to his Scheme, that It has no Reason or Foundation at all. Your Lordship has exposed his Ignorance: His Boldness must be repressed by Others.

It was not for Nothing, that in his Preface he entered his Plea for a general Liberty, that Every Man upon Every Subject, should speak his Mind freely, without Controll: He knew very well, how much Occasion he should have for such an Indulgence. Your Lordship has taken a proper Notice of the Propagation of his wicked Opinions, and at the same time of his Majesty's most Christian Zeal, and the ready Assistance of his Ministry to stop the Progress of them.

I esteem it one part of the Blessings GOD has given me, that I am a Member of your Lordship's Diocese: and as such I could not properly inscribe an Argument of this Nature to any Name but your Lordship's.

Your Goodness to your Clergy, Your most Effe-
ctual Exhortations to the Faith and Discipline of
the

the Church of England upon true Catholic Principles, and to inviolable Loyalty to His Majesty and his Government, have endeared You to us and to all Good Men, who love the Church of England and the Protestant Succession.

I trust your Lordship will pardon the Boldness of this Address: and that you may long live an Ornament of the Church to Vindicate her Faith, and Maintain her Government, as you have, not only in your Writings, but in your Excellent Charges deliver'd to your Clergy most worthily done, against all Loose and Destructive Notions, is the hearty and earnest Prayer of,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's

Most Dutiful Son,

Edmund-Hall,
May 6. 1725.

and most Obedient Servant,

HENRY FELTON.

This Epistle is written to the Church at Corinth.

1 Cor. XV. 23.

*But every Man in his own Order :
Christ the First-fruits ; afterward
They that are Christ's at his Coming.*

Saint Paul in this part of his Epistle treats professedly of the Resurrection of the Dead : and having laid the Resurrection of Christ for a Foundation, he proceeds to confute the Heresy of those, who said there was no Resurrection of the Dead, arguing reciprocally from Christ's Resurrection to Ours, and from Ours to Christ's, as they do mutually infer each other.

Those that acknowledge the Resurrection of Christ must, according to the Apostle, acknowledge also the Resurrection of the Dead, because if there be no Resurrection of the Dead, then Christ is not risen : and he drives them to this Strait, either to acknowledge the Resurrection of the Dead, or to deny the Resurrection of Christ.

* St. Chrysostom in his 39th Homily or Discourse on this Epistle, does in a very just and lively manner expose the Absurdities to which they are reduced, who believe the Resurrection of Christ, and yet deny the Resurrection of the

* Tom. 3. Edit. Eton.

B

Dead :

Dead : His Argumentation is beautiful and strong, and proceeds upon these undoubted Principles of the Gospel Dispensation and Economy : That there can be no reason assign'd for the Death and Resurrection of Christ, but on the account of Ours : That Christ is to be consider'd as Lord and Judge of the Dead : as the Head of the Body : and the First-fruits of the Dead. But He cannot be Judge of the Dead, if they were to lie in their Graves for ever; neither can He be the Head of the Body, unless the Members shall rise as well as the Head; nor the First-fruits from the Dead, unless the Dead do follow. These are necessary Relations, 'tis impossible to separate them, and to deny one is to deny the other. To deny the Resurrection of the Dead overthrows and vacates the whole Gospel at once : and if this be not admitted, no one Point of the Gospel is true. Our Preaching is false, our Faith is vain; *we are yet in our Sins.* There is an indissoluble Chain and Connection between Christ's Resurrection and Ours, and without Ours none of the great Ends and Purposes of the Gospel can be attain'd : Neither Salvation nor Condemnation, neither Rewards nor Punishments can succeed.

The whole Argument is summ'd up and put upon this short Alternative by joining the sixteenth and twentieth verses, *If the Dead rise not, then is not Christ risen : But Christ is risen, and become the First-fruits of them that slept. Christ is risen, therefore we shall rise also.*

So natural is the Transition, and so evident the Consequence, from Christ's Resurrection to Ours! Since by Man came Death, by Man, that is by Christ the First-fruits, came also the Resurrection of the Dead: For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive: Yet not indiscriminately, in a confused and tumultuary manner, But every Man in his own Order: Christ the First-fruits; afterward They that are Christ's at his Coming.

From these Words may be deduc'd,

- I. The General Resurrection of all Men.
- II. The Identity of the Body at the Resurrection.
- III. The Order in which every Man shall rise.

I. From these Words may be argu'd the General Resurrection of all Men, that shall be dead from the beginning to the end of the World; For tho' the Apostle in illustrating this Argument speaks only of the Resurrection of the Just, yet in laying out the Extent of it he speaks of the Resurrection of all. As universally as all die in Adam, so universally in Christ shall all be made alive. But our Lord himself hath taught us that all shall not rise to the same Blessed Condition of Life; For the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves, shall bear his voice, and shall come forth: They that have done good, to the resurrection of Life; and they that have done evil, to the resurrection of Damnation. Joh. 5.29. And the Words of the Text setting forth the Order in which all shall be made alive, however they have been restrain'd to the Resurrection

of the *Just*, are doubtless to be understood of *All*. *All* that die in *Adam* shall be made alive in *Christ*; *Every Man in his own Order*. The Term is universal. Every one is all, without exception of any. And St. *Chrysostom* upon the place argues a General Resurrection, not only from the universality of the Term, but particularly from the *Order* in which *every Man shall rise*; *The Just first, afterward the Unjust*.

II. As St. *Chrysostom* argues a General Resurrection, ¹ *Tertullian* from these Words clearly asserts the *identity of the Body* for the Persons that shall rise, and the *difference of their Merit*, for the *Order* in which they shall rise. For if *Every Man* rises in his own *Order*, *Every Man* must rise in his own *Body*; The *Body* that is dead must rise, or there is no Resurrection, and *Every Man* must rise in his own *Body*, or *Every Man* cannot rise in his own *Order*. The Notion of *Identity* is here strictly confined to the very *Body* of every one that is dead: It is not enough to define what makes the same Person, if Man could be the same Person he was, without his own *Body*, the Question in the Resurrection is what makes the *same Body*, or whether the *same Body* shall be rais'd, and appropriated to the *same Man*, or the *same Person*, it belong'd to before. 'Tis with respect to the *Body* alone, in which Man *dies*, that he is said to *rise*, and therefore unless he rises in the same *Body* he cannot rise at all. To give him another *Body* is not to raise that which is dead, this is forming a new one, not raising up the

¹ De Resurrectione Carnis, pag. 416, 417. Edit. Rigalt.

old. And as far as the Body is a constituent part of Man, as far as every Man in his own Body is an *Individual*, so far another Body makes another *Man*, and another *Man* makes another *Person*.

There is no one Point more labour'd in this Argument, than to avoid the Necessity of an *Identical Resurrection of the same numerical Body*, and the strongest Efforts they were able to make, have been made by two Writers of the last Century: viz. the celebrated Author of an *Essay concerning Humane Understanding*: and the Author of the *Naked Gospel*. Both of them confine *Personality* to the *Soul*: Both of them the first expressly, the *Naked Gospel* by implication place *Identity* in ² *Consciousness alone*: Both of them make it indifferent to what Body the *Soul* is join'd; and the ³ last particularly considers the *Body* as nothing more than the *House we dwell in, or the Clothes we wear*. And indeed both their Reasonings end in the same Conclusion, and the *Body*, however it may make *Part* of the *Man*, is yet, according to them, no *Part* of the *Person*; and as by *Person* they mean the *Soul*, we arrive at this wise Determination, that *the Body is no part of the Soul*.

It is endless almost to follow the *first* thro' all his Notions of *Identity* and *Person*, and 'tis almost needless to spend the Time in Confuting the *broad Assertions* of the *last*, when barely

¹ *Eff. B. 11. c. 27. §. 9.* To find wherein Personal Identity consists, we must consider what *Person* stands for; which, I think, is a *thinking Intelligent Being*. *Naked Gosp. part 1. p. 76.*

² *Eff. §. 10, &c. N. G. p. 76.*

³ *Eff. in the same chap. & passim. N. G. p. 76. 79.*

to recite them is at the same time to expose them.

But I shall nevertheless, to support the Doctrine of the *Resurrection* against their Attacks, consider what they have advanc'd in these three Notions :

1. Concerning *Personality*.
2. Concerning *Identity*.
3. Concerning the *Body in its Relation to the Soul*.

And if all they have advanc'd upon these three Subjects should be admitted, it will follow, perhaps, that there is no need that the same Body should rise, when any or none would do as well, but it will not follow against express Revelation, that there shall be no Resurrection of our Bodies which are laid in the Grave, or that the same Bodies shall not every one be rais'd and united to the same Soul that departed from them.

But there is no need of granting their Notions, and a little Examination will shew at once the Extravagance and Falseness of them.

1. And first for *Personality*.

When the *Author* of the *Essay* was resolved to make *Identity* consist in *Consciousness alone*, it was necessary to make *Personality* consist only in the *Soul*. In order to this he makes a Distinction between *Substance Man* and *Person*, not only as if each could, but as if each ought to be conceiv'd without the other. It is true they are *distinct*, and we can consider *each* by *it self* in our Minds; But when these *Ideas* are apply'd to one *Subject* in *which* they all *meet* and are *combin'd*,

bin'd, however we may abstract and separate them in our *Thoughts*, we cannot separate them in the *Nature* and *Existence* of things. Tho' every *Substance* is not *Man*, yet every *Man* is a *Substance*; tho' every *Person* is not *Man*, yet every *Man* is a *Person*. We say, that *Man* consists of two *Substances*; one *Material*, which is the *Body*; the other *Spiritual*, which is the *Soul*; and from the *Conjunction* of Both results the *Person*. The *Person* of *Man* is not his *inward Nature alone*, but his *outward Appearance*, his *visible Body* also, that which we see, converse and transact with.

The word *Person*, this Author tells us very truly, is a *Forensic Term*, and tho' he would refer the Meaning of it to the *Soul* alone, yet the *Law* looks upon it in a more Compound View, and takes in the *Body* as well as the *Soul* of *Man*. Indeed the Enquiries of the *Law* are upon the *Facts*, not the *Consciousness* or *Conscience* of the Offender; and by *Person* the *Law* understands the *Parties in Suit*, or the *Prisoner* at the Bar.

In common Acceptation *Person* is very properly apply'd to the *Characters* and *Offices* of Men in all their Transactions, *Sacred* or *Civil*, *Public* or *Private*, and is accordingly *Principal* or *Vicarial*; this hath no relation to the *Intelligent Being* abstracted from the *Body*, and he that affronts, assaults, and wounds the *Man*, is properly said to affront, assault, and wound the *Person*.

When the Scriptures warn us against accepting of *Persons in Judgment*, the *Person* there is not the *Soul*, or the *Intelligent Being* as such, but the *Poor*, the *Rich*, or the *Mighty*; the *Person* of the *Prince*,

Prince, or the Person of the Needy: and when God is said to be *no respecter of Persons*, it is not meant of the *Soul*, (for he truly respects the *Soul* alone) but in respect of the *Great and Mighty, of the Few and Gentile.*

This *Civil and Natural Personality* is dissolv'd by *Death*, and we say properly, there *was* such a *Person*, but he is *dead*; there *is* no such *Person* *now*: and this *Personality* is restor'd at the *Resurrection*, and the *Person* is said to *rise*, when the *Body* is rais'd and reunited to the *Soul*.

The word *Person*, when apply'd to pure Intellectual Beings, is borrowed from *Man*, and it is apply'd, not only as it respects the *Soul of Man*, but as it respects his *Actions*. In this sense we use the Word with reference to the Holy Blessed and Undivided Trinity, because we cannot find a better to express the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as distinguish'd from each other by such *Acts*, as we properly call *Personal*. Now tho' the Father and the Son may be call'd two *Persons* by reason of their *Relation* as well as *Acts*, and the *Holy Ghost* a third *Person*, by reason of his *Relation* and *Personal Acts*, which distinguish him to be neither the *Father*, nor the *Son*, tho' *Angels*, which never are so call'd, may perhaps more properly be call'd *Persons*, because they are *Individuals*, yet the *Soul of Man separately taken* can never be call'd the *Person of Man*, because the Person consists, or is made up of the whole *Man*.

If we grant that by *Person* is understood an *Intelligent Being*, and that no *Being else* can be call'd a *Person*, yet it does not follow, that the

Soul

Soul alone, because an *Intelligent Being* is therefore the *Person of Man*: It makes *Man a Person* indeed, because it makes him an *Intelligent Being*; but when we call *Man a Person*, we must include What makes him a *Man*, as well as What makes him a *Person*. *Man* had not been *Man* had not God given him a *Body*, any more than *Angels* are *Men*; and therefore as he had not been *Man* without a *Body*, we may justly conclude, that where *Man is not*, there, properly speaking, cannot be the *Person of Man*.

By *Person* then when apply'd to us, is not to be understood an *Intelligent Being* alone as such, but an *Intelligent Compound Being* as *Man*, which makes the *Body* a Part of the *Person* as much as of the *Individual*.

If what I have deliver'd concerning the *Person of Man* be true, this Writer's Notion of *Identity* falls of course, unless *Consciousness* may be extended to the *Body*, not that the *Body* is *Conscious*, but that the *Soul* is *Conscious* of the *Body*, whether it be the *same* or *not*. But this is far from this Author's Meaning: The *Soul*, the *Person* according to him never regards what *Body* it is join'd to; and *Self*, by which he expresses *Identity of Person*, is the *same of whatever Substance it is made up, whether of the same, or other Substances*. But the Truth or Falshood of his Notions will best appear upon Examining

2. What he hath advanced concerning the *Identity of Person*.

This Author makes *Identity of Person* to consist in *Consciousness* only, and he makes the *Person* to consist of the *Soul* alone, or that *Thinking*

Thing within us, and yet he resolves that the same Identical thinking Substance is not necessary to the Identity of the Person: That the Person is the same, if his Consciousness be the same, whether the thinking Substance be the same or no, as if the same Consciousness was not necessarily annex'd to the same Soul; and so at last Identity of Person has nothing to do with the Soul, tho' the Soul be the Person, but consists in Consciousness alone apply'd or transfer'd to any thinking Substance.

From whence, according to him, it follows, that even in finite Substances, one Substance may be two Persons; on the other hand, such is the Power of Consciousness, that supposing two Men had the same Consciousness, they would make but one Person, and, according to his own Instance, ² Socrates and the Mayor of Quinborough would be the same: if he had pleas'd, he might have added to each Case a third Person, and so of three distinct Substances have made but one Person, or of one Substance three distinct Persons.

These are *Mysteries* not of God's revealing, but of Man's own making, and if these Positions are true in finite Substances, methinks the Doctrine of a Trinity should not be so incredible in an Infinite Being. He that can make one Substance to be different Persons by reason of a different Consciousness in the same Soul, or different

* §. 12. The Question is, whether if the same Substance, that thinks, be changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining the same, it can be different Persons; and he resolves, That, the Substance changed, the Person may be the same, and that, the Substance remaining the same, the Person may be different. §. 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23. * §. 19.

Men in different Ages to be the same Person by reason of the same Consciousness in different Souls, need not demur to any Mystery revealed in the Gospel.

When he makes *Person* to be an intelligent *Being* only, I should imagine, that *Consciousness* alone, in which he makes the *Identity* of the *Person* to consist, should while it secur'd the *Identity* of the *Person*, at the same time have preserv'd the *Identity* of the intelligent *Being*. But tho' *Person* be an intelligent *Being*, it is not, it seems, this or that intelligent *Being*, but may, if it can take its *Consciousness* along with it, transfer itself to another *Substance*, and be still the same *Person*, when it is no longer the same *Being*.

How the *Identity* of *Person* is consistent with the *Change* of that *Being*, in which the *Person* subsists, must be left to those that hate *Mysteries* to explain, and with me it shall be no Wonder, that *Identity* of *Person* may subsist in another *Body*, when so much Pains is taken to perswade us, that it may subsist in another *Soul*: unless by *Soul* perhaps is meant a material *Substance*, and then again my Wonder is at an end.

After all this, it may be proper to consider, wherein *Identity* of *Person* do's truly consist, as it is apply'd to *Man*, and as the *Person* of *Man* is the proper Subject of this Question. To satisfy this Enquiry, I am bold to lay down this Conclusion, That *Identity* of *Person*, as apply'd to *Man*, either to *Body* or *Soul* or *Both*, doth not consist in *Consciousness*, and so proceed to assert *Identity* of *Person*, answerable to my first Determination.

That *Consciousness* is no true Principle of *Identity*, is evident from the Wonders this Author ascribes to it, and the Account he gives of it : For this *Identifying Consciousness* is made, by this Writer, a thing that adheres to no one *determinate Subject*; and that which is of a desultory Nature leaping from one to another, making the same *Person distinct* and *Another the same*, can be no Principle of *Identity*.

But had he fix'd and determin'd this *Consciousness* to one and the same *numerical Soul*, yet the *Identity* of this *Soul* would not consist in *Consciousness*, any more than the *Identity* of the *Body*, to which it was join'd. For be the *Soul* what it will, *Person* or not *Person*, its *Identity* consists in that Principle, which makes it *one*, and preserves it the *same*, as it is compar'd with, or related to other *Beings* of the *same Nature*, or of a *different Kind* from the Beginning throughout the whole Continuance of its Duration. If it ceases to be the *same Substance*, or if it continues not numerically the *same*, its *Identity* is immediately lost; whether it be *Conscious* or not *Conscious*, *Intelligent* or not *Intelligent*, is not the Question: The *Soul* is still the *same*, as long as it exists in the *Body* or out of the *Body*. That it is *Conscious*, rises from the Will and Bounty of the *Creator*: that it is the *same*, is owing to its Continuance in that *Singularity* of it self, and that *Distinction* from other *Beings*, in which it was created. Whatever makes *Identity* in other *Beings*, makes it in the *Soul*; and by the same Principle, the *Body* or any thing else is the *same*, that is the *same* also.

But

But further, there is an *Identity* of *Body* as strict as of the *Soul*, and tho' the *Body* is said to consist of Particles in a continual Flux, and not to continue the *same* for any number of Years, yet this is not to be admitted without special Consideration. For tho' what we call the *Humours* and *Flesh*, may be in a continual Flux and Succession, yet the *Solid parts*, the *Substratum*, that supports the *Accidents*, must be the *same*; and the *Form* of our Bodies is like the *Forms* of other Bodies, *fixed* and *unalterable*.

Plants and Flowers after all the Torture of the *Chymist*, after *Maceration* in the Mortar, and *Calcination* by the Fire, still remain in their *Forms*: and as by several Experiments they are found to be recoverable, and by a gentle Application of Heat to rise distinctly from their *Dust* and *Chaos*, in which they lie confused; they do give us at once a Demonstration of the *Identity* of the *Body*, and afford us a noble Instance of the *Body's rising again* from its Ashes, after it hath been burnt and tortur'd a thousand Ways. God alone can see our *Substance*: we converse with our selves, as we do with other Bodies, by perceiving and viewing the *Accidents* and *Surface* only, and yet if *Consciousness* has any Relation to *Identity*, we have a *Consciousness* that our *Bodies* are the *same*, that they are Part of our selves, that is of our *Persons*, however altered to outward View by Age or Sicknes.

But tho' we cannot describe this *Substance* of ours, this *Original Principle*, that is gradually *expanded* into all these Parts and Dimensions;

Gaffarel. Curiositez innoyez, L. 5. N. 9,

tho'

tho' we cannot describe the *Substratum* of our own *Bodies* any better than of Stones or Metals, or any other *Bodies*; yet whatever it is that up-holds this *Frame*, whatever that is which continues a *Likeness* in the Lines of the *Face*, in the Conflux and Configurations of the *Veins* and *Arteries*, and determines the *Body* to a particular *Make* and *Figure*, still answering, as it were, to the Mold it was cast in; That, whatsoever it be, preserves the *Identity* of the *Body*, and all that I should desire in this Question is, that in the same Sense in which our *Bodies* are the *same* from the Womb to the Grave, however flux and alterable by the Course of Time, we would only think, they may be as much the *same* at our *Resurrection*, and consist of *Parts* that were as properly *our own* at the time of *Death*, as any *Parts* are *our own* in any time of our *Life*.

Consciousness as it refers to our own Being is a necessary *Act* of the *Mind*, which by our *Thinking* convinces us that we are; yet it is not confin'd to the *internal Act*, whereby we conclude, that we do exist: but it extends to our *whole Being*. To speak properly and truly, we are, while we live, as truly *Conscious* of the *Body's Existence* as of the *Soul's*; and when we die, tho' we are not *Conscious* to the *Body's Existence*, yet the *Soul* is *Conscious* of its *Separation*, and finds that *Personality*, which resulted from the Union of *Soul* and *Body*, to be *dissolv'd*. But neither our own *Existence* and *Identity*, nor the *Existence* of things and their *Identity*, depend upon our *Consciousness* or *Knowledge*: We are what we are, and they are

are what they are; the same severally, each in its self, whether we are Conscious, or whether we know it or no. A Man is as much the same in a Lethargy or a Frenzy, and his Soul is the same numerical Soul, as in the clearest Exercise of his Reason: and the same Soul while joyn'd to the Body is the same Person, notwithstanding that wretched Quibble of a Man's being not *Himself* or *beside Himself*, for no Body was ever so silly to think, that the Person was not the same, tho' the Man was mad.

To speak positively upon this Question, the Identity of Person consists in the Principles of Individuation: I say Principles, because there is a Principle of Individuation, which makes the Body one and the same; and there is a Principle of Individuation, which makes the Soul one and the same, and from the Union of these two Individuals arises a third, the Individual Person of Man.

Now in all Creatures the Principle of Individuation is that which fixes their numerical and singular Existence; when any Creature ceases to be the Individual it was, it ceases to be the same, and Consciousness therefore can be no Principle of Identity, because it is none of Individuation, but according to this Writer's Hypothesis changes and destroys the Individual, by being transferr'd from one to another.

To apply this to the Point before us; The Author tells us, ^a that by this Notion of Identity we may be able without any difficulty to conceive the same Person at the Resurrection, tho' in a Body not exactly in Make or Parts the same which he had here, the same Consciousness going along with the

Soul that inhabits it. That is, the Person will be the same in a different Body, and in a different Soul too, if the Consciousness be but the same. For he tells us for a Foundation of this, ¹ Let a Man once find himself Conscious of any of the Actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same Person with Nestor; and so without any difficulty you may conceive, how by being Nestor he is the same Person at the Resurrection, he was, before he was Nestor: for this must be the Sense, if we fill up the Clause, and when we conceive the same Person, do signify what Person we conceive.

But as in conceiving the same Person (which is odly and indefinitely express'd) we may ask, Who the Person is, or what Person? we may also ask, At what Resurrection, or the Resurrection of what? For this is a Word thrown in without any Meaning or Application: he does not mean the Resurrection of the same Body, That he utterly explodes: nor does he mean the Resurrection of the Dead from the Grave, for That he explodes likewise: he cannot mean the Resurrection of the Soul, for that do's not die, at least he has not thought fit to say it do's; but he means the Uniting of the Person, or rather the Consciousness of the Person to some Portion of Matter, or other, like, or not like the Body of Man; and this is his Notion, so far as I can drive him to a Point, of the Resurrection.

But if This can be call'd a Resurrection, we must observe that it is not this or that determinate Person that rises; for if I once happen to find my self Conscious of any of the Actions of Nestor, then it is Nestor and not I, or Nestor

and I together, that are without any difficulty to be conceiv'd the *same Person* at the Resurrection.

We must confess these Notions are too refin'd for our Brains, and that we do not without any difficulty conceive, how the *Consciousness* of Nestor apply'd to the *Soul* of Cato, and joyn'd to some System of *Matter* or other, call'd a *Body*, makes the *same Person* at the Resurrection.

To these Subtilties it may be sufficient to oppose our plain Notions, and leave it to ordinary Understandings to determine in this Point between us. Let us for once suppose (to make the thing the easier) that every *Person*, that is, every *Soul* retain'd its *own Consciousness*, the Question is not, whether the *same Person* shall live again in a *Body*, but whether the *Man* that is dead shall rise again in his *own Body*: The *Soul* is not consider'd here any further than in its *Reunion* to the *Body*. *That which dies, is to revive, that which is laid in the Dust, is to rise again;* for if the *same Body* do's not rise, the *Man* cannot in any Sense be said to rise again from the Dead.

We are not enquiring any thing concerning that *Person* of his, which never dies, nor whether thro' *Consciousness* it continues the *same*, whatever *Body* it is joyn'd to; but we enquire in the plain Road of Common Sense, whether, because nothing can rise from the dead, but what is dead, whether the *Body* that died shall rise again, and because that *Body* cannot rise, if another be raised in its stead, our plain Question

^{*} See St. Chrysostom. οὐ τὸν νεκρὸν ἀναστῆσε. Tom. 6. p. 712.

is concerning the Resurrection of the *same Body*; and when the *same Body* is united to the *same Soul*, then we apprehend, that the *same Person* who *died* may be said to be *risen again*.

But this *Identity of Body* signifies nothing it seems with this Author, and his Reasoning upon it ends exactly in the same Conclusion with the other, that it is *indifferent what Body is united to the Soul at the Resurrection*, the *Body* being no more than a *Veil or Garment* to the *Soul*.

This brings me to consider

3. Thirdly, What the Author of the *Naked Gospel* has advanc'd concerning the Relation of the *Body* to the *Soul*.

My time will not permit me, and there is no necessity to be particular upon this Question. He makes the *Body* incapable of partaking either in Rewards or Punishment: he makes it *insensible* as a *Stone*, and allows it to share with us in Life no more than the *House we dwell in, or the Clothes we move in*, and therefore to argue, it must be the *same Body, that shall receive Punishment at the Resurrection is the same thing*, he says, *as to say, the Malefactor must be executed in the same Clothes, in which he committed the Crime.*^{1.}

He pretends to ground his Assertion upon the Words of the *Apostle, 2 Cor. 5. 1, &c.* But he abuses the *Scripture* and perverts the *Apostle's Meaning*, for no one surely did ever expound those *Metaphors* to a *literal Sense*, nor ever concluded from them, that our *Bodies* were as *Lifeless* as the *Walls*, and had no more *Feeling* than our *Clothes*. The Passage tho' highly deserving

the most exact Consideration, is too long for a full Explication; only 'tis observable, that the Apostle speaking of our *Bodies* as the *Frail Tabernacles*, in which we *sojourn* for a little Time, and expressing his Confidence of a more *durable House, Eternal in the Heavens*, speaks still of the *same Body*, when he earnestly desires not to be *Unclothed*, but *Clothed upon*; that *Mortality*, or what is *Mortal* in us, *may be swallowed up of Life*, which is in the Words of this Chapter, that *this Mortal may put on Immortality*. So far is this Scripture from his Purpose, that it is a rich and a pregnant Proof of the *Resurrection* and *Glorification* of the *same Body*.

As to the Assertion it self, I shall not run into a Philosophical Disquisition, but content my self with these short Strictures upon it.

We do not know the *term* and *manner* of *Union* between the *Soul* and *Body*, nor how they *act reciprocally* upon *each other*, and it may be more difficult to assign a *pure Intellectual*, than a *meer Bodily Act*: perhaps the *Soul* cannot so *abstract it self*, as to leave the *Body Quiescent*, since the *Operations* of our *Minds* in this *united State* depend upon the *Texture* and *Disposition* of the *Body*.

But these things we understand: That there are in *Men* an *Animal Life* and *Animal Functions*, *answerable* to those in *Brutes*: That *this Life* is *maintain'd*, and *these Functions* *perform'd*, and the *Species* *continu'd* in a manner exactly *correspondent* in *Man* and *Beast*: That *Death*, or the *Dissolution* of *this Animal Life*, happens in the *same Way* to both, by *Age*, by *Sickness*, or by *Violence*:

Violence: That *Brutes*, tho' they have no *Reflexion*, have yet *Sensation*; and why *Man* may not be *sensible* in his *Body*, as *They* are in *theirs*, no good Reason can be assign'd: That *Sensation*, which in *Brutes* terminates in the *Animal Spirits*, should with *Us* terminate in the *Soul*, must be ascrib'd to the *intimate Conjunction* of *Soul* and *Body*; but to say, that in *Us* the *Animal Life* has no *Sensation*, is to pronounce more than we can demonstrate.

So that the *Body* may be capable of *Pain*, and the *Soul* sensible of the *Body's Pain*; or if the *Body* were only a *Vehicle* or *Instrument* to administer *Pain* to the *Soul*, since this *Pain* may be convey'd by the *same*, as well as *another Body*, there may be some Reason, why the *same Body*, which was the *Instrument* of the *Soul* in *sinning*, should be *also* the *Instrument* of its *Punishment*.

But further, when we find several *Affections* and *Appetites* peculiar to the *Body*, which cannot even in this *State of Union* be properly apply'd to the *Soul*, we may understand that the *Body* hath not only *Life* and *Sensation*, but by reason of its *Appetites*, may be an *Accomplice* with the *Soul*, and may consequently, as *partaking* in the *Crime*, be made *Partaker* in the *Punishment*.

I pass over the *Affections* of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, *Weakness* and *Weariness*, *Sickness* and *Death*, which touch not the *Soul*, nay, as to the last, the *Soul* is often most *Vigorous* when the *Body* is *Weakest*, and is then most *Lively* when the *Body* is nearest its *Dissolution*.

The *Concupiscent Appetite* belongs properly to the *Animal Life*, without Respect to the *Rational*,

nal, and it is the *Brute Part* in us, that is carried out to sensual Pleasures, to Lewdness and Intemperance: The *Soul* has no Share in these things, but *Consent* and *Consciousness*: These are *Actions* resulting from the *Animal Life* alone, and are proper, tho' not so common, to *Brutes* as to *Men*. That we are *Accountable* for them is, because we have *Reason*, and that *Brutes* are *not accountable* is, because they have *not Reason*; and if we please to think, how much the *Soul* is influenced by the *Lower Appetites*, it may be admitted Reasonable, that the *Body* should suffer, or at least the *Soul* in the *same Body*.

Upon this way of Reasoning there may be more *Necessity* of the *Soul's* being punish'd in the *same Body*, than of a *Malefactor's* being executed in the *same Clothes* in which he committed the *Fact*. Because his *Body* may be something more concern'd than his *Coat*, and his *Head* not altogether so innocent as his *Hat*.

After all, that the *Body* is something more than a *Garment*, we may learn from Himself, when to serve another Purpose he pleads, *how little desirous the Soul would be of meeting her old Companion, from a remembrance of all the Contentions she had with it; all the Wounds she receiv'd from it; and all the Dangers which she narrowly escaped by watching against it.*¹ These Words have no Meaning, or within the *Body* he includes the *Fleshy Lusts* that war against the *Soul*.

But these are Inconsistencies familiar to these Writers, who will allow of no Absurdities, but those of their own making, and will suffer no *Body* to contradict them, but *themselves*.

This Doctrine we might imagine should be very mortifying to those, who on other Occasions express such a Concern for the *Body*, and have such *high Notions* of *organized Matter*; but when an *Article of Faith* is to be disputed, they can easily come into the same Conclusion, and with them it is not material *what Body* is joyn'd to the *Soul*.

Only the *Author* of the *Essay* must be so far excepted, that in stating *Identity* he neither admits the *Identity* of *Body* into his *Idea* of the *Identity* of *Man*, nor the *Identity* of the *Soul* into the *Identity* of *Person*; but *Consciousness* alone is *all in all*, and that being the *same*, it makes the *same Person*, *whatever Soul or Body it is joyn'd to*.

By what hath been said we find that there is somewhat a nearer *Relation* between *Soul* and *Body*, than between a *Man* and his *Apparel*; and if *Bodies* must be *raised*, it is not altogether *indifferent* to *what Body* the *Soul* is *reunited* at the *Resurrection*.

The *Author* of the *Essay* has a *Notion* of the *Resurrection* of the *Dead*, without any *Resurrection* of the *Body*, whether the *same* or any *other*; But his *Resurrection* of the *Dead* is only a *Resurrection* of *Persons*, and as far as he holds the *Resurrection* of the *same Person*, 'tis no more than a *Resurrection* of the *same Consciousness*. This other Writer not quite so *subtil*, only argues against the *Resurrection* of the *same Body*, from those conclusive Topics, and some others as conclusive as those, which we have mention'd; and in opposition to both, we may venture at last upon this just Conclusion: That
the

the same Numerical Bodies, which die, shall be rais'd again, and be united each to the same Soul, and so be brought to Judgment, thereto receive Rewards and Punishments according to what every one hath done in his Body, whether it be Good or Bad; They, that have yielded their Members as Instruments of Unrighteousness unto Sin, shall be punish'd in those Members or that Body; and they, that have yielded themselves unto God, and their Members as Instruments of Righteousness unto God, shall be rewarded in those Members, or that Body which they compose. For we may conclude with ² St. Chrysostom, a much better Philosopher, because a better Christian than our Modern Refiners, that it is not agreeable to Justice, that one Body should sin and another bear the Punishment, that the Members of Righteousness should be punished, and the Members of Unrighteousness rewarded; but every one shall bear his own Burden in his own Body: There is Sense and Reason and Justice in asserting the Resurrection of the same Body, because there can be no Resurrection but of that which died, and especially because of the Sentence to Life or Death Eternal, which is to follow. But to contend for any other Resurrection is absurd, and no less, than under the Notion of another to deny any at all.

To raise the same Body out of the Dust into which it is resolv'd, is more Natural than out of other Matter to create and organize a New one. And to give to every Soul its own Body again, is most agreeable to our plain Conceptions; For it would look very strange to see a Believer's

Soul joyn'd to an Atheist's Body, or the Soul of an Infidel in the Body of a Saint.

Concerning the Possibility of a Resurrection in General, and of an Identical Resurrection in Particular, I need not discourse, till we meet with such Arguments as have not been answer'd.

And I have no Room to proceed to the Order of the Resurrection, tho' that very Order yields some peculiar Arguments for the rising of the same Body, and shews the Resurrection to be no confused undistinguish'd Act, but an Act of the justest Regard and Discretion, an Act of Separation of the Righteous from the Wicked, in which such an Array and Disposition is used in bringing Mankind to Judgment, as is highly suitable to the Majesty, Mercy, and Justice of the Judge, and to the Proceedings and Solemnity of that great Tribunal.

But I shall close the whole with an Application of some Scriptures to the Doctrine we have been defending, which will help to shew, that the Question is truly of the Body, the Very same Body, tho' our¹ Adversaries say, we do not find that the Scriptures do in express Terms mention the Resurrection of the Body, much less of the same Body. And truly, I take the plain Reason to be, that the Holy Scriptures trusted to the Common Sense and Apprehension of Mankind, that we could not think of any Resurrection but that of the Body, nor of any Body but the same.

For besides the Propriety of the very Notion, from the Scriptures we learn that our Bodies

¹ N. G. and Mr. Lock against the Bp. of Worcester.

are

are redeem'd as well as our Souls : Ye are bought with a Price : therefore glorify God in your Body and in your Spirit, which are God's. 1 Cor. 6. 20. To which I may add the Exhortation to the Romans 12.1. I beseech you therefore, Brethren, by the Mercies of God, that ye present your Bodies a living Sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable Service. From the same place in the Corinthians (6. 19.) we are taught that our Bodies are the Temples of the Holy Ghost, and therefore not to be defiled ; and with respect to our most merciful Redeemer, we are not only Partakers of his Spirit, but are Members of his Body, of his Flesh, and of his Bones. Ephes. 5.30. Now what the Consequence is of this Union between Christ and us, we are instructed in the Text, he is the First-Fruits, we are the Harvest. But particularly in the eighth Chapter to the Romans : Now if any Man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. But if the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the Dead, dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the Dead, shall also quicken your Mortal Bodies by the Spirit, that dwelleth in you. v. 11.

¹ Let us mortify therefore our Members, which are upon the Earth, and regard our Bodies as the Temples of God, ² and while we ³ wait for the Redemption of our Bodies, having an assured Faith, that they shall be redeemed from the Grave, let us remember that we are Citizens of that New Jerusalem, which is Free, and the Mother of us all, that we are entitled to all its Privileges and Immunities, and shall be fully admitted to them,

¹ Col. 3. 5. ² 1 Cor. 3. 16. ³ Rom. 8. 23. ⁴ Gal. 4. 26.

if we forfeit not our *Charter*, and lose not our *Right of Inheritance*.

And therefore, let us pray, that ¹ our whole *Spirit, and Soul, and Body* be preserved blameless unto the Coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. That he may ² present us *Holy and unblameable and unreprovable in the sight of God*.

³ Only let our *Conversation* be as becomes the *Gospel of Christ*, suitable to our blessed *Hopes and Interests in Heaven*, ⁴ From whence also we look for a Saviour the Lord Jesus, who shall change our *Vile Body*, that it may be fashion'd like unto his *Glorious Body*, according to the Working, whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto Himself. To Him therefore with the Father, and the Holy Spirit be ascribed, as is most due, all Honour, Praise, Might, Majesty, and Dominion, for ever and ever. Amen.

* ¹ Thess. 5. 23. ² Col. 1. 22. ³ Philip. 1. 27. ⁴ Ib. 3. 20, 21.

F I N I S.

THERE is now in the Press, and will shortly be publish'd, on the same Text, and by the same Author, A Discourse concerning the *Universality and Order of the Resurrection*.

Φ. K. N.
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